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Abstract 
 
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist 
arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions 
without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that 
physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I 
develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their 
particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing 
experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of phenomenal concepts 
that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it 
reinforces dualism. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Physicalism
1
 is confronted with well-known anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge 
argument (Jackson 1982), the explanatory gap argument (Levine 1983), and the conceivability 
argument (Kripke 1972; Block 1980). These arguments are based on the phenomenal 
character of consciousness; the distinctive what-it-is-likeness of undergoing experiences such 
as seeing the blue sky, tasting red wine or being in pain. In the contemporary debate, the 
phenomenal concept strategy (Stoljar 2005) is considered one of the most powerful responses 
to these anti-physicalist arguments. The basic idea of this strategy is to rely on special 
concepts—phenomenal concepts—to explain why we draw dualist conclusions from these 
arguments. Hence, the goal of the phenomenal concept strategy is to give a satisfactory 
account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions.  
For this strategy to work, physicalists have to elaborate the crucial particularities of 
phenomenal concepts and demonstrate that these features can explain away the anti-
physicalist arguments in a satisfactory way. For a first approximation, we can categorize 
accounts of phenomenal concepts roughly along two lines (see Balog 2009, 303f.): Some 
accounts take the particular features of phenomenal concepts to be found in their direct 
reference function and construe phenomenal concepts analogously to demonstrative concepts 
(e.g. Horgan 1984; Levin 2007). Others focus primarily on the special mode of presentation 
involved in phenomenal concepts and take phenomenal concepts to be constituted by 
experiences (e.g. Balog 2012; Block 2007; Papineau 2002). 
In this chapter, I will analyze the explanatory power of the phenomenal concept strategy 
with regard to Jackson´s knowledge argument. In his paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982), 
Jackson asks the reader to imagine the brilliant scientist Mary who has complete physical 
                                                 
1 Physicalism can be roughly defined as the thesis that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism can be stated in 
terms of facts, which would amount to the following claim: all facts about the world are physical, or necessitated 
by or supervenient on physical facts. Anti-physicalism denies this claim and often points at phenomenal facts as 
a paradigm case of non-physical facts. 
knowledge of human color vision but was born and raised in an achromatic environment and 
has never undergone a color-experience in her life. The crucial question is what happens when 
Mary enjoys her very first color-experience. On the basis of this thought experiment Jackson 
developed the knowledge argument against physicalism which can be formulated (in a strong 
version that aims at non-physical facts) as following:  
 
Premise P1: Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her  
release.  
Consequence C1: Therefore Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision  
before her release  
Premise P2: There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision  
that Mary does not have before her release.  
Consequence C2: Therefore (from (P2)): There are some facts about human color vision  
that Mary does not know before her release.  
Consequence C3: Therefore (from (C1) and (C2)): There are non-physical facts about  
human color vision. (Nida-Rümelin 2009: 3) 
 
In a first step, after briefly considering demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts, I will 
argue that especially constitutional accounts
2
 offer a lot for a better understanding of the 
knowledge argument. In a second step, I will investigate the demands that the physicalist 
target imposes on a physicalist interpretation of the constitutional account. I will show that the 
Mary-scenario cannot be explained entirely in terms of physicalist constitutional accounts that 
draw upon empirical research, for example by holding that phenomenal concepts involve 
stored sensory templates. These accounts fail to explain how phenomenal concepts can carry 
introspectively accessible information about the phenomenal character of experiences. In a 
third step, I will propose a new interpretation of the constitutional account which meets the 
explanatory constraints best, but involves features that imply non-physical referents. In 
particular, the self-representing character of the experiences involved in the concept will turn 
out to imply non-physical referents. In this respect the defended account of phenomenal 
concepts differs significantly from those put forward by Papineau (2007), Balog (2012) and 
Block (2007)—it strengthens the dualist intuitions instead of explaining them away. 
 
 
2. Analysis of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy (PCS) 
 
The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is put forward by type-B-materialists (Chalmers 
1997). Type-B-materialists grant that there is an epistemic gap
3
 involved in anti-physicalist 
arguments such as the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, and the conceivability 
argument, but doubt the legitimacy of drawing an ontological conclusion from epistemic 
premises.
4
 To explain the epistemic gap, the defenders of the PCS rely on phenomenal 
                                                 
2 In the following, I subsume the quotational and the constitutional accounts under the label “constitutional 
account”, since both accounts share the idea that a phenomenal concept is constituted by an experience—but this 
does not entail that the constitution needs to be understood as analogous to a quotation-relation. For example, 
one could count Lehrer’s (2012) account of exemplar concepts as a version of the constitutional account, but 
Lehrer explicitly rejects the idea of quotation in exemplarization. 
3 For example, Mary´s epistemic gap is illustrated by the fact that she cannot deduce a priori a phenomenal truth 
from all the physical truths.  
4
 There are various ways of cashing out the idea that Mary gains new knowledge while holding that this does not 
entail an ontological dualist conclusion. If physicalism is construed as a thesis about facts, one might think that 
Mary gains knowledge of a new (fine-grained) proposition that is made true by some “old” fact she already 
knew. If one states physicalism in terms of truths (i.e. all truths about the world are necessitated by the complete 
physical truth) then one might choose another way. For example, assuming coarse-grained propositions (e.g. sets 
concepts. As highlighted in Loar’s paper “Phenomenal States” (1990/1997), the starting point 
of the PCS is the Fregean idea that one single ontological entity can be known under different 
modes of presentation. Thus, this reply can be easily formulated on the level of concepts—a 
move that leads to the notion of phenomenal concepts on the one hand and the notion of 
physical concepts on the other. Once these two sorts of concepts have been established, 
defenders of the PCS present, for example, Jackson’s Mary-scenario as analogous to standard 
cases of co-reference. According to the defenders of the PCS, the physically omniscient 
scientist Mary possesses all physical concepts when being confined to her achromatic 
environment, but acquires a new phenomenal concept when she enjoys a blue experience for 
the first time. The key move is the claim that the phenomenal and the physical concept of 
blue-experiences pick out one and the same physical referent. 
Since defenders of the PCS aim to explain anti-physicalist arguments, they grant that 
phenomenal concepts cannot be deduced a priori from physical concepts. In other words, the 
phenomenal concepts Mary gains from her first color-experiences are conceptually isolated 
(Carruthers & Veillet 2007) from all other concepts she had before. Thus, defenders of the 
PCS must explain why phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from physical ones, 
despite the fact that they pick out the same alleged physical referents. Those who undertake 
the PCS point to important particularities of phenomenal concepts to provide such an 
explanation. Hence, according to those who defend the PCS, no metaphysical entities, such as 
non-physical properties, have to be invoked to explain Mary’s new knowledge. It suffices to 
highlight the uniqueness of phenomenal concepts. Obviously, the crucial argumentative step 
of this strategy is to elaborate the decisive particularities of phenomenal concepts. 
 
2.1. What the Knowledge Argument Teaches Us about Phenomenal Concepts 
 
In the following, I confine myself to the knowledge argument because a careful investigation 
of Jackson’s thought experiment helps to illustrate the crucial particularities of phenomenal 
concepts best. The key issue is the following: what happens when Mary leaves her achromatic 
environment, enjoys her very first color-experience, and thereby acquires a new concept, 
providing the foundation of her new knowledge?  
In a first step, the knowledge argument illustrates the special acquisition condition of 
phenomenal concepts. Given the premises of the argument, the physically omniscient scientist 
possesses all physical concepts but is not able to deduce the relevant phenomenal concepts. 
Since Mary acquires a phenomenal concept when undergoing her first color-experience, the 
conceptual isolation of phenomenal concepts can be explained by the special acquisition 
condition: a person can gain a new phenomenal concept only under the condition of 
attentively undergoing the relevant experience.
5
  
                                                                                                                                                        
of possible worlds or Russellian propositions), one might hold that Mary gains only a new mental representation 
of an “old” truth. All of these responses question the inference from the epistemic premise (Mary lacks some 
kind of knowledge) to the ontological consequence of the knowledge argument.  
5 It is subject to discussion whether this acquisition condition should be formulated as a necessary condition. One 
might, for example, think that Mary can gain a phenomenal concept of orange experiences by combining her 
phenomenal concept of red experiences and her phenomenal concept of yellow experiences and, hence, without 
necessarily undergoing an orange experience. A possible rejoinder is the following: in the case that this 
imaginative combination of phenomenal concepts should turn out as successful, Mary would create an instance 
of an orange experience and this would provide the basis for her new phenomenal concept. Unfortunately, for the 
lack of space, I cannot pursue this issue in detail here. So I just want to point out that this consideration has no 
impact on the knowledge argument, since Mary had no color experiences at all in her achromatic room.  
Also Dennett (2007) formulated an argument against the view that undergoing an experience is a necessary 
condition for gaining a phenomenal concept by invoking Swamp-Mary’s possession of phenomenal concepts. If 
one agrees with Dennett, no epistemic progress has to be explained in the Mary-scenario—it could be the case 
that Mary already possesses phenomenal concepts in her achromatic environment. This paper is not aimed at 
responding to this consideration. Thus, I confine myself to note that defenders of the PCS grant that the scientist 
In a second step, the knowledge argument teaches us that Mary makes epistemic progress 
because of her first color-experience. A wide range of arguments have been developed to 
explain this epistemic step. Some hold that rather than acquiring new propositional 
knowledge, Mary only acquires some new abilities, such as the ability to remember, 
recognize, and imagine color-experiences (Lewis 1988; Nemirow 2007). Others (e.g. Tye 
2009) hold that Mary only gains new knowledge by acquaintance, which Tye deems object-
knowledge.  
In contrast, defenders of the PCS do not rely on different sorts of knowledge but rather 
focus on the concepts involved. The following examples illustrate the scientist’s epistemic 
progress formulated on the level of concepts: Mary can use her new phenomenal concepts to 
think new thoughts such as “R (where the term “R” expresses the phenomenal concept of a 
red experience) is what it is like to look at red tomatoes!” By deploying these new concepts, 
the scientist can make new introspective judgments such as “Oh, I like R more than the 
experience I had when looking at the achromatic TV-screen!” Moreover, the subject 
possessing the concept can use it to recognize or imagine the relevant experience. 
Accordingly, the second particularity of phenomenal concepts can be stated as follows: 
phenomenal concepts play a specific cognitive role—they carry information6 about the 
phenomenal character of experiences, and they make this information introspectively 
available to the subject possessing the concept.  
To sum up, according to the knowledge argument, Mary’s newly acquired phenomenal 
concepts exhibit two crucial particularities: they possess special acquisition-conditions and 
they play a unique cognitive role. Next, I analyze the question of whether physicalist accounts 
of phenomenal concepts can explain these two particularities in a satisfactory way. 
 
2.2. Physicalist Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts 
 
In recent literature, sophisticated physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts have been 
developed.
7
 One of the earliest versions of phenomenal concepts and the locus classicus for 
the PCS is Loar’s direct recognitional account (1990/1997). Loar argues that phenomenal 
concepts refer directly to phenomenal properties (which are taken to be physical properties), 
and the very same phenomenal properties constitute the modes of presentation involved in the 
concepts. Other, subsequently developed accounts focus on one of these two features of 
phenomenal concepts.
8
 
Theories that take phenomenal concepts as involving phenomenal properties are the 
constitutional accounts (Papineau 2002; Balog 2012) and accounts that concentrate on the 
distinct conceptual role of phenomenal concepts (Hill and McLaughlin 1999). These versions 
often draw on empirical research to explain away dualist intuitions. For example, Papineau 
(2007) holds that phenomenal concepts involve stored sensory templates analogous to 
perceptual concepts. Hill and McLaughlin suggest that distinct cognitive faculties are 
                                                                                                                                                        
makes epistemic progress by attentively enjoying her very first color-experience, and that she can acquire the 
corresponding concept only on the basis of this experience. This is what Balog labels the “Experience Thesis” 
(Balog 2009: 299), and defenders of the PCS commit themselves to this special acquisition condition. 
6 Philosophers like David Lewis (1988) may argue that in claiming that the phenomenal concept carries 
information, I have already given the game away to the anti-physicalist. Hence, I want to point out that I am 
using the notion of “information” here in a very weak sense. At this stage of my argument, I leave it open 
whether this notion implies that Mary gains new information or simply gains “old” information carried in a new 
way.  
7 For an anti-physicalist approach to phenomenal concepts see Chalmers (2003, 2007) and his notion of “direct 
pure phenomenal concepts”.  
8 Unfortunately, for the lack of space, I can only give a rough categorization of the extensive literature on 
phenomenal concepts and I have to leave several details and accounts aside. More detailed characterizations of 
the numerous sophisticated accounts of the PCS can be found, e.g. in Balog (2009). 
associated with physical and phenomenal concepts and, hence, no distinct reference-fixing 
properties need be invoked to explain away the anti-physicalist arguments.  
Other accounts focus on the direct reference of phenomenal concepts to avoid different 
reference-fixing properties being involved in phenomenal and physical concepts. For 
example, the causal-recognitional accounts (e.g. Tye 2003)
 9
 as well as demonstrative 
accounts (e.g. Horgan 1984; Levin 2007) concentrate on the direct reference function.  
I start by briefly recalling why some philosophers think that demonstrative accounts cannot 
satisfactorily explain away dualist intuitions. Especially, demonstrative accounts that do not 
rely on a specific mode of presentation involved in the concept are taken to face numerous 
problems. A general problem of demonstrative accounts is highlighted by Chalmers (2003). 
He argues that Mary gains a demonstrative concept of the phenomenal character of her 
experience, but she also acquires what he calls a “pure phenomenal concept” of the same 
property, which involves a phenomenal mode of presentation. The point is that it is 
cognitively significant for Mary to find out that these two concepts co-refer. Thus, a pure 
phenomenal concept cannot be reduced to the demonstrative one. Tye (2009: 51) criticizes 
demonstrative accounts along another line: according to him, the puzzling question of how a 
brain state can be identical with a phenomenal state does not seem to be captured by the 
question of how a brain state can be identical with “this”. Balog (2009) also criticizes 
accounts that concentrate on the direct reference function of phenomenal concepts. According 
to her, these accounts leave too much distance between the concept and the experience, so that 
the problematic scenario of a basic application of a phenomenal concept in absence of the 
experience becomes conceivable. 
In the next section, I will add to these considerations a new argument for the importance of 
the special mode of presentation involved in a phenomenal concept to capture the dualist 
intuitions. I will concentrate on the question of how a phenomenal concept can carry 
introspectively accessible information about the phenomenal character of experiences. I will 
argue that this question can neither be answered by pure demonstrative accounts nor by those 
physicalist constitutional accounts that deny the importance of a specific mode of presentation 
involved in the concept.  
 
Here are some preliminary remarks to clarify the crucial notions that will be involved in my 
argumentation:  
First, I take phenomenal concepts to be mental representations that can be constituents of 
thoughts. This means that I am not identifying concepts with modes of presentation. However, 
I think that a mode of presentation is involved in a phenomenal concept and that this is 
crucial. Note that this does not mean that I take phenomenal concepts as having modes of 
presentation in the sense that there could be Fregean cases of two modes of presentation of 
one single phenomenal concept. Rather I think that phenomenal concepts are mental 
representations that have modes of presentation as a constituent, i.e. properties that constitute 
the way the concept presents the referent to the subject. Thus, a specific mode of presentation 
is necessarily tied to a specific phenomenal concept.  
Next, I want to point out that here I confine my analysis to basic applications of 
phenomenal concepts, i.e. phenomenal concepts which are applied from the first person 
perspective to occurrent experiences. This is because my investigation aims at shedding light 
on the referents of phenomenal concepts and does not aim at giving a full account of 
phenomenal concepts, including their non-basic applications.
10
 
                                                 
9 For Tye’s current position on phenomenal concepts, namely, that there are no phenomenal concepts which 
meet the physicalist requirements, see Tye (2009). 
10 When we think about experiences of other persons (or, as some philosophers hold, also in the case of thinking 
about our own future or past experiences), phenomenal concepts are applied in a non-basic (or “derivative”) 
way. There are different ways of fleshing out the relation between basic and non-basic applications of 
A final note on the notion of “phenomenal character”: there is something it is like for a 
subject to undergo an experience. What it is like to undergo an experience is commonly called 
its “phenomenal character”. Hence, phenomenal characters are properties that are instantiated 
by experiences. It is plausible to assume that an experience has a specific phenomenal 
character essentially, i.e. if it had another phenomenal character it would be a different type of 
experience. I want to emphasize that I am not using the notion of “phenomenal characters” to 
presuppose that these are non-physical properties. At the beginning of my investigation, I 
leave open the possibility that the phenomenal characters might turn out to be physical 
properties, although the final outcome of my analysis will be that they are non-physical. 
 
2.3. Physicalist Demands and Problems of the PCS 
 
As noted before, pure demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts are taken to face 
various problems. The next question is: do physicalist constitutional accounts of phenomenal 
concepts face problems as well? I will analyze Papineau´s account as an exemplar of 
constitutional accounts that meet the physicalist demands. However, I think that the outcome 
of my analysis generalizes to all accounts that neglect the importance of the phenomenal 
mode of presentation involved in a phenomenal concept. 
Defenders of the physicalist constitutional account claim that the explanatory 
particularities of phenomenal concepts can be found in their special nature. For example, 
Papineau (2002) developed a constitutional account suggesting that phenomenal concepts 
embed experiences just as quotation marks embed words. According to this view, the 
structure of the phenomenal concept can be described as follows: this experience ----, where 
the blank is supposed to be filled with an actual experience or a copy of an experience.  
Recently Papineau (2007) made some changes to his description of phenomenal concepts, 
abstaining from the demonstrative aspect built into the concept. But he maintains that his 
current view of phenomenal concepts 
 
(…) retains one crucial feature from my earlier quotational-indexical model, namely, that 
phenomenal reference to an experience will deploy an instance of the experience, and in 
this sense will use that experience in order to mention it. (123) 
 
This view has it that phenomenal concepts use experiences. Papineau draws upon an 
empirical thesis about perceptual concepts to flesh out his version of phenomenal concepts: 
 
We can think of perceptual concepts as involving stored sensory templates. These 
templates will be set up on initial encounters with the relevant referents (…). For the 
perceptual concept to be deployed, the relevant stored sensory template needs either to 
be activated by a match with incoming stimuli or to be autonomously activated in 
imagination. (118) 
 
On this view, phenomenal concepts turn out to be just special cases of perceptual concepts:  
 
Phenomenal concepts (are) simply a further deployment of the same sensory templates, 
but in this case used to think about perceptual experiences themselves rather than about 
the objects of those experiences (122)  
 
So the idea that a phenomenal concept uses an experience is described in a purely 
physicalist manner: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
phenomenal concepts. On a weak interpretation, non-basic applications depend on previous experiences; on a 
stronger interpretation non-basic applications depend on previous basic applications of phenomenal concepts. 
Think about what happens when a phenomenal concept is exercised: Some stored 
sensory template is activated and is used to think about an experience. (123) 
 
Obviously, Papineau does not concentrate on the mode of presentation involved in the 
concept anymore. He rather invokes the special vehicle that realizes the concept in order to 
explain its uniqueness. The use-mention function shall explain why phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually isolated. Since the phenomenal concept uses an experience, one has to undergo 
the relevant experience first to acquire the concept. Mary, locked up in her achromatic 
environment, is not able to store the relevant sensory template and, hence, cannot acquire or 
deploy the phenomenal concept. This is supposed to be a consequence of the special nature of 
phenomenal concepts—namely, their use-mention-function—rather than an indication of the 
non-physical nature of the referents.  
 
Let me analyze the explanatory power of this account. Recall that in order to explain the 
Mary-scenario satisfactorily, I imposed two explanatory constraints. A theory of phenomenal 
concepts, besides being able to explain their conceptual isolation, must also offer an account 
of their cognitive role. I think that Papineau is able to explain the conceptual isolation of 
phenomenal concepts by fleshing out their special acquisition conditions and by pointing at 
the special vehicles that realize the concepts.  
But can this model explain the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts as well? More 
precisely, can an account of phenomenal concepts that concentrates on their neural vehicles 
and leaves their mode of presentation aside explain how phenomenal concepts are able to 
carry the relevant information and make this information introspectively accessible to the 
subject? My main worry is that every model of phenomenal concepts that leaves the mode of 
presentation aside fails in explaining the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. A detailed 
analysis of Papineau´s account will reveal the crucial problem.  
First, note that on a physicalist account, the experience that is used in the phenomenal 
concept has to be understood as a physical item. For example, the stored template that is 
activated in deploying the concept is understood by Papineau as a neural template.  
Second, what sort of usage of this neural template does Papineau have in mind? I think that 
the right way is to think of the neural template as a part of the concept.
11
 This interpretation 
can easily explain how a phenomenal concept comes to carry the relevant information.
12
 
Third, according to Papineau the template constitutes the phenomenology involved in a 
phenomenal concept, but it does not fix the reference. Rather the reference is fixed by the 
causal origin of the concept and by the sort of information attached to the concept. Note that a 
phenomenal concept accumulates information about experiences, i.e. according to Papineau 
information about the neural template.  
The crucial question is: How can a concept that is partly constituted by a neural template 
facilitate the specific information about experiences that Mary lacks in her achromatic 
                                                 
11
 I see two options to interpret the claim that a concept uses a neural template. On the first interpretation, this 
claim is intended to capture just a simultaneous occurrence of concept and neural template. Thus, the template is 
not part of the phenomenal concept, and hence it is not the concept that carries the relevant information. What 
carries the information is the template which is only contingently connected to the concept. Moreover, on this 
reading it is unclear how a neural template can make the relevant information accessible to the subject 
possessing the concept. The second way to go is to think of the neural template as a part of the concept. This 
interpretation evades the problem of explaining how the concept comes to carry the relevant information. 
12
 For example on Dretske’s (1981) account, a regular co-occurrence might suffice to account for information. 
Contrary to this, I will argue that a more intimate link between concept and experience is needed to explain the 
concept’s cognitive role of carrying the relevant information and making it accessible to a subject. Moreover, I 
will argue that scenarios in which a basic phenomenal concept is applied in the absence of its referent should be 
ruled out by an adequate account of phenomenal concepts—but this seems to be conceivable if there is no 
constitutional link between the phenomenal concept and the experience. 
environment?
13
 The demands imposed by physicalism are to cash out the concept in physical 
terms. This generates a problem for the defender of the physicalist constitutional account. 
Obviously, the relevant information is not information about a neural template under a 
descriptive mode of presentation, since Mary could know this in her achromatic environment. 
Nor is it information about a neural template under a physical mode of presentation, since 
Mary could have seen this neural template under a physical mode of presentation in her 
achromatic environment—for example in another person’s brain whilst he is looking at 
something blue. But this would not help her in figuring out what enjoying a blue experience is 
like. So the relevant information concerns what it is like to have that neural template 
activated. Thus, the activation of the neural template used by the phenomenal concept has to 
involve the right phenomenology for the concept to carry the relevant information and to 
provide the basis for phenomenal knowledge. To acknowledge the importance of the right 
phenomenology tied to the phenomenal concept amounts to the claim that the mode of 
presentation involved in the concept is crucial. 
In contrast to my analysis, the physicalist Papineau denies the importance of the 
phenomenal mode of presentation involved in the concept:  
 
On my account, phenomenal concepts do indeed refer because of their cognitive 
function, not because of their phenomenology and therefore other states with a different 
or no phenomenology (…) would refer to the same experiences for the same reasons. I 
see nothing wrong with this. (2007: 125) 
 
On my view, there is something wrong with this account of phenomenal concepts. The reason 
is that—in contrast to other sorts of concepts—a phenomenal concept can fulfill its cognitive 
role only if the experience which partly constitutes the concept involves the right 
phenomenology.  
At this point one might object that Papineau just states that the phenomenology is 
irrelevant for the reference of phenomenal concepts and not for their cognitive role. Papineau 
thinks that the reference of a phenomenal concept is fixed by its cognitive function rather than 
by the mode of presentation involved. But he also holds that the cognitive function of a 
phenomenal concept is to accumulate information about experiences. What sort of 
information about experiences is at stake? The Mary-scenario illustrates that the relevant 
information is information about the phenomenal character of experiences, i.e., according to 
Papineau, it is information about what it is like to have the neural template activated. Thus, to 
claim that Mary gains a new phenomenal concept that could be given under another 
phenomenology (i.e. involving the activation of another neural template), or even under no 
phenomenology at all, does not do justice to the epistemic situation the knowledge argument 
illustrates. What is at stake is a phenomenal concept that carries information about a specific 
phenomenal character of an experience and that makes this information accessible to the 
subject possessing the concept. Mary might possess concepts like those suggested by 
Papineau.
14
 The important point is that these concepts cannot be the ones we are looking for, 
namely phenomenal concepts that explain Mary´s epistemic development. We are looking for 
                                                 
13 Levine (2007) argues as well (but in a different way than I will propose hereinafter) that the physical presence 
of the represented experience within the concept does not explain its cognitive presence. 
14 For example, perceptual concepts can be like that. What it is like to have a specific neural template activated 
might not be reference-fixing in the case of concepts that refer to external objects. But phenomenal concepts 
refer to experiences. Experiences have their phenomenal character essentially. Thus, the mode of presentation 
involved in a phenomenal concept is crucial for the referent, i.e., if a phenomenal concept uses the phenomenal 
character of blue experiences to present its referent, then the referent is a blue-experience. 
phenomenal concepts that facilitate information about the phenomenal character of 
experiences and, hence, involve a specific phenomenal mode of presentation.
15
 
I want to illustrate the claim that phenomenal concepts have to involve a specific mode of 
presentation to carry the relevant information and to make this information introspectively 
accessible by elaborating a reduction ad absurdum: on Papineau´s account there is a 
contingency in the relation of concept and its phenomenology. The phenomenology involved 
in the concept could vary without the concept varying and viceversa. This model not only 
leads to implausible scenarios but also to false judgments. Let us imagine for the sake of a 
reductio ad absurdum a possible world in which Mary possesses a phenomenal concept of 
blue experiences tied to the phenomenology of an orange experience (but referring to blue 
experiences). According to Papineau, there is nothing wrong with this scenario. The problem 
is the following: an account of phenomenal concepts that does not link the phenomenal mode 
of presentation involved in the concept to its referents cannot explain their cognitive role of 
delivering the information about a specific phenomenal character of an experience. Imagine 
that Mary tries to find out if blue experiences belong to unique or to binary hue experiences in 
her phenomenal color space. If she uses her phenomenal concept of blue experiences, which 
is tied to the phenomenology of an orange experience, to figure this out, she might end up 
with the introspective judgment that blue experiences belong to phenomenal binary hues. This 
seems at least to be an undesirable result. 
Further implausible scenarios are close at hand. For example, we can imagine a possible 
world in which a phenomenal concept of blue experiences is tied to the phenomenology of a 
tickle. Also in this world, the phenomenal concept is supposed to carry information about the 
phenomenal character of blue experiences and to make this information introspectively 
available. Moreover, in cases in which the phenomenal concept involves no phenomenology 
at all, it remains completely mysterious how one could make any introspective judgments 
about the phenomenal character of the experience at all, using these concepts. In this case, 
Mary would be no better off than she was in her achromatic environment looking at neural 
activations of another person’s brain.  
Hence, the claim that Mary might gain a new phenomenal concept (which may constitute 
her new phenomenal knowledge) even if the concept is tied to no phenomenology at all 
remains mysterious. Thus, we have found strong reasons for the following claim: no account 
of phenomenal concepts that fails to posit an intimate link between the phenomenal modes of 
presentation involved in the concepts and their referents can successfully explain the Mary-
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 A motivation for the view that a specific phenomenology involved in a phenomenal concept is irrelevant for 
its reference can be the commitment to the transparency thesis. Papineau (2007: 124) explicitly points out that 
his theory can account for the transparency thesis, since on his account deploying a perceptual concept referring 
to a bird and deploying a phenomenal concept referring to a bird-experience will involve the same 
phenomenology. The reference of these concepts is determined by what sort of information is attached to the 
experience that is used—if it is bird-appropriate information, then it will turn out as a perceptual concept; if it is 
information about bird-experiences then it will turn out as a phenomenal concept. Accordingly, defenders of the 
transparency thesis (e.g. Harman 1990; Tye 2002; Crane 2003) might hold that Mary´s new experience 
represents properties of external objects. Hence, on this account the phenomenology is not necessarily tied to the 
referent of a phenomenal concept, since it is not seen as a property of an experience anymore.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the merit of the transparency thesis. I think that experiences can 
represent the external world, but they also can represent themselves. Here I am concerned with the latter case. 
The following scenarios illustrate that the phenomenal character is a property instantiated by an experience. 
Imagine Mary who is exposed to a flash of red light that fills her whole visual field. Or consider that a 
neurologist evokes a red experience in her, by manipulating her brain. Also well-known examples that point to 
blurry vision, where the experience itself, not the objects of experience, is experienced as blurry, challenge the 
transparency thesis. I think that these cases illustrate that Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept that refers to 
the phenomenal character of her experience. Since experiences have their phenomenal character essentially, an 
account of phenomenal concepts that do not involve specific phenomenal modes of presentation, fails in 
explaining their cognitive role. 
scenario. Thus, we have to search for an alternative account of phenomenal concepts pointing 
at specific features that can explain these concepts’ cognitive role in a satisfactory way. 
 
Chalmers (2007) reaches a similar conclusion as the outcome of his master argument. He 
argues that any version of the PCS has to fail because of the following dilemma: either we can 
conceive of a possible world in which P & ~C holds (=the complete physical truth about the 
universe holds, but a thesis about phenomenal concepts does not)—then phenomenal concepts 
are not physically explicable. Or we cannot conceive of a possible world in which P & ~C 
holds—then phenomenal concepts cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to 
phenomenal experiences. Therefore, according to Chalmers, accounts of phenomenal 
concepts that are physically explicable are too “thin” to explain our epistemic situation, 
whereas “thick” accounts that meet this explanatory constraint are not explicable in physical 
terms.  
In what follows I will argue for a stronger conclusion. To Chalmers´ conclusion, namely, 
that the explanatory accounts cannot be explained in physical terms and hence do nothing to 
deflate anti-physicalist arguments, I will add that those phenomenal concepts that have the 
explanatory power imply non-physical referents. So the difference between Chalmers’ 
argument and the one put forward hereinafter is the following: while in Chalmers’ view, a 
physicalist could still hold that phenomenal concepts are not themselves physically explicable 
but that they are nonetheless compatible with physicalism, I argue that an account of 
phenomenal concepts that explains our epistemic situation satisfactorily is not compatible 
with physicalism. 
 
 
3. The Encapsulation Account of Phenomenal Concepts 
 
In the previous section, I argued that no account of phenomenal concepts that fails to posit an 
intimate link between their modes of presentation and their referents can successfully explain 
the Mary scenario. Thus, we need a new account of phenomenal concepts. In this section, I will 
develop the encapsulation account that meets both explanatory constraints imposed by the 
particularities of phenomenal concepts. 
A brief reminder of the two explanatory constraints: the first desideratum concerns the 
special acquisition condition of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts cannot be 
deduced a priori from physical concepts and, hence, are conceptually isolated. In accordance 
with defenders of the PCS, I think that a new phenomenal concept can be acquired only under 
the condition of attentively undergoing an experience. The second explanatory constraint 
concerns the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. When Mary attentively looks at the blue 
sky and thereby acquires a phenomenal concept of blue experiences,
16
 she makes epistemic 
progress. This epistemic progress is explained by the cognitive role of the phenomenal 
concept: the phenomenal concept carries information about the phenomenal character of blue 
experiences and makes this information introspectively available.  
In the following, I will present the encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that does 
justice to both explanatory constraints. First, I will extend the analysis of the conceptual 
isolation of phenomenal concepts by offering an explanation as to why phenomenal concepts 
have this particular acquisition condition. Second, I will argue that the proposed account can 
also explain the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts in a satisfactory way. 
                                                 
16 Here I am describing what happens to Jackson’s Mary. As Lehrer (2012) suggests, one could imagine Mary 
having undergone a stroke and, hence, still being able to have experiences though lacking all her conceptual 
capacities. Therefore, undergoing an experience might not be a sufficient condition for gaining a phenomenal 
concept. In this paper, I leave it open if having an experience is a sufficient condition for acquiring a phenomenal 
concept; the important point here is that having an experience is a necessary condition. 
 Physicalist defenders of the PCS grant that one has to undergo an experience to acquire a 
phenomenal concept. This way of formulating the acquisition condition needs to be spelled 
out in more detail. In order to acquire a new phenomenal concept one has to attend to the 
experience and to discriminate it from all other current experiences. I am assuming that 
primitive discrimination can be accomplished in a nonconceptual manner.
17
 Thus, the act of 
attentive discrimination is the basis of a process that yields a phenomenal concept. The 
account of phenomenal concepts that I offer is inspired by Lehrer’s (2011, 2012) account of 
conceptualization in what he calls the process of “exemplarization”. I take the experience the 
person attentively discriminates to be conceptualized in a special manner. Following Lehrer, I 
hold that in conceptualization the experience is used to mark a distinction between what is 
included in the reference class of the phenomenal concept and what is not. The experience can 
play this role because it exhibits its phenomenal character, i.e. the referents of the phenomenal 
concept have exactly those features that the experience exhibits. Hence, when acquiring a new 
phenomenal concept we first are undergoing a non-conceptual experience that, due to 
attentive awareness, is discriminated from the other current experiences. Next, because the 
experience exhibits its phenomenal character, we can conceptualize the experience.
18
 
This interpretation of the concept acquisition process sheds light on the nature of 
phenomenal concepts. When Mary is attentively aware of her new experience, this process of 
attentive discrimination combined with the experience’s role to mark a distinction between 
what is included in the reference class and what is not by exhibiting its phenomenal character, 
leads to a new phenomenal concept that encapsulates the experience itself. What I label as 
encapsulation is based on the idea that the experience itself is the core of the phenomenal 
concept.
19
 This constitutional link between experience and concept explains how the reference 
of the phenomenal concept is fixed: namely, due to the experience’s role to directly exhibit 
the referents of the concept.  
Given the constitutional link between experiences and phenomenal concepts, the 
encapsulation account has to provide an answer to the following question: what distinguishes 
the experience from the concept encapsulating it? To a first approximation we can say that the 
concept has a structure and cognitive role that outruns the encapsulated experience. The 
important point is that the concept implies a generalization about the phenomenal character of 
the experience that enables the subject to distinguish what falls under the concept and what 
does not.
20
 So the generality of the phenomenal concept is what distinguishes it from the non-
conceptualized experience. Moreover, the subject possessing the concept can use it to think 
new thoughts, to make new judgments, etc. For example, she can think “R is my favorite 
experience!” or “The experience caused by looking at ripe tomatoes is R”. In short, the 
                                                 
17 Note that I do not claim that occurrent experiences are always discriminated in a nonconceptual manner. I just 
think that primitive discrimination does not depend on possessing a concept and can be accomplished 
nonconceptually.  
18 I want to highlight that using Lehrer´s account of conceptualization on the basis of experiences for spelling out 
the encapsulation account does not mean that I buy wholesale into his account of exemplarization. Importantly, I 
think that only self-representing experiences can constitute a phenomenal concept. In contrast, Lehrer holds that 
exemplarization is not restricted to experiences. In Fürst (2012), I argue in detail that Lehrer´s notion of 
exemplarization faces serious problems when it is not confined to self-representing experiences. 
19
 Balog (2012b), Block (2007), and Chalmers (2003) defend accounts of phenomenal concepts that share the 
structure of the here advocated encapsulation. Where Balog and Block think that such an account is compatible 
with physicalism, Chalmers holds that the content of “direct phenomenal concepts” is not conceptually reducible 
to the physical or functional. In the following, I will argue that if the encapsulation account is spelled out in 
detail, it has more explanatory power than the physicalist accounts and it will turn out to be incompatible with 
physicalism. 
20 Lehrer (2011, 2012) argues that the experience in the concept can be used to mark a distinction between the 
entities that fall under this concept and those that do not. This way of fleshing out what makes the phenomenal 
concept encapsulating an experience to a concept is borrowed from Lehrer. 
possession of the phenomenal concept enables the subject to attribute a phenomenal property 
to something. All this cannot be done solely by having an experience—a concept has to be 
formed which encapsulates the experience and uses it to display its referent. 
 
3.1. Self-Representation: the Key to the Encapsulation Account 
 
In this section, I will start spelling out the decisive feature of the encapsulated experience in 
detail. Subsequently, I will analyze the consequences that the decisive feature of the 
encapsulated experience has on the concept.  
 
My main claim is that experiences, which are encapsulated in a concept and fulfill the role of 
displaying the referents of the concept by exhibiting their phenomenal character, are self-
representing.
21
 Self-representation is sometimes held to account best for conscious 
experiences. (See e.g. Kriegel 2004, 3, 153f.; Levine 2006, 177f.) A reason for this claim can 
be stated as follows: conscious experiences are states we are aware of being in. Awareness 
includes representation. And, according to defenders of self-representational approaches to 
consciousness, conscious states are not represented via other (higher-order) states but rather 
are represented by themselves. So we can say that self-representing experiences exhibit two 
features: first, they represent themselves directly, without any separate mode of presentation 
involved.
22
 Second, the self-representing character of experiences explains our awareness of 
them.  
The first feature explains how an experience can be conceptualized in a way that yields a 
phenomenal concept as suggested on the encapsulation account: an experience that represents 
itself can be encapsulated in a phenomenal concept and thereby fix the concept´s reference by 
directly exhibiting the referents.  
The second feature elucidates why I think that self-representation is the basis for the 
encapsulation account. The explanatory structure in the concept forming process is the 
following: self-representation explains our awareness of the experience, and the attentive 
awareness of the experience is a condition for forming a concept that encapsulates the 
experience.  
Most importantly, the self-representational character of experiences does not only explain 
how a phenomenal concept can be formed—it also explains how the concept can play its 
cognitive role. Recall that the cognitive role of a phenomenal concept is to carry information 
about the phenomenal character of experiences and to make this information introspectively 
accessible to the subject. First, because the encapsulated experiences are self-representing, 
they directly display the referents of the concepts. Thus, the encapsulated experience enables 
the concept to carry the relevant information. Second, the self-representing experience allows 
us to be aware of it, which explains how the information carried by the concept is 
introspectively accessible to the subject. Therefore, the self-representing character of 
experiences can account for the special formation process of phenomenal concepts as well as 
for their cognitive role. 
 
Next, I will analyze the structure of the concept that encapsulates the experience. The self-
representing character of the experience has particular consequences for the concept.  
First, it guarantees the direct reference of the concept formed on the basis of the 
experience. Since there is no separate mode of presentation involved, the phenomenal concept 
picks out its referent directly.  
                                                 
21 For a historical discussion of the notion of self-representation see Brentano (1874) and Meinong (1899). For a 
contemporary discussion of self-representation see, for example, Kriegel & Williford (2006) and Lehrer (2004, 
2006, 2012). 
22 Of course, besides this, they can also represent properties of objects of the external world.  
Second, the reference of a phenomenal concept is fixed by the mode of presentation 
involved in the concept that contains an instance of the concept’s referent. Since the reference 
of phenomenal concepts is fixed by their internal constitution and not by external factors, 
phenomenal concepts are rigid, viz. they pick out the same referent in all possible worlds. 
Recall that we were looking for an account that links the mode of presentation involved in a 
phenomenal concept intimately to its referent. Constitution guarantees such intimate link. 
Given the internal constitution of phenomenal concepts, the problematic scenarios developed 
in section two—i.e. Mary employing a phenomenal concept of blue experiences but that is 
tied to the phenomenology of an orange experience or to no phenomenal experience at all—
are ruled out.  
Moreover, the encapsulation account evades also a closely related problem that is typically 
faced by demonstrative versions of phenomenal concepts. As Chalmers (2007) and Balog 
(2012) point out, on demonstrative accounts, one can imagine the experience picked out by a 
phenomenal concept and currently demonstrated as having a different character. I have argued 
that this scenario is also conceivable on those constitutional accounts that do not concentrate 
on the mode of presentation involved in the concept (e.g. Papineau´s account). Notice that this 
worrisome scenario is avoided by phenomenal concepts that encapsulate experiences. Such 
concepts necessarily yield information about the specific phenomenal characters of 
experiences and pick out the very same referents in whatever context they are exercised. 
 
I argued that phenomenal concepts encapsulate self-representing experiences. This account 
has strong explanatory power.  
It explains the conceptual isolation of phenomenal concepts. Moreover, by offering an 
account of the concept formation process, it adds an explanation as to why phenomenal 
concepts have these special acquisition conditions.  
Most importantly, the encapsulation account also meets the second explanatory constraint 
and accounts for the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. The encapsulation of the 
experience explains how the concept carries the relevant information. The self-representing 
character of the encapsulated experience explains why the relevant information is 
introspectively accessible. Once the cognitive role is explained by an account of phenomenal 
concepts, an explanation of the epistemic progress one makes because of the new concept 
acquisition is close at hand. The encapsulation of a self-representing experience in the 
phenomenal concept explains, for example, how Mary can think new thoughts such as “I like 
Yves-Klein-blue experiences more than light-blue experiences!” Since the experience itself is 
a constitutional part of the phenomenal concept, she can compare the two experiences by 
deploying the relevant concepts.
23
  
Finally, the encapsulation account does justice to the intuition that, for example, a 
phenomenal concept of a red experience necessarily facilitates information about the 
phenomenal character of red experiences. The encapsulation provides what we were looking 
for, namely an intimate link between the mode of presentation involved in phenomenal 
concepts and their referents. Thus, the worrisome scenarios discussed in section two are ruled 
out.  
I conclude that the encapsulation accounts provides the best account of the uniqueness of 
phenomenal concepts— their conceptual isolation as well as their cognitive role. 
 
3.2. The Dualist Consequences of the Encapsulation Account  
 
                                                 
23 The encapsulation account also offers some elucidation regarding phenomena like the following: someone 
vehemently refusing to talk about a painful experience undergone in the past, or someone eager to talk about her 
feelings towards a new love. Because the employed phenomenal concepts encapsulate relevant experiences, one 
will be eager to discuss pleasant experiences and disinclined to relate painful memories.  
In the previous section, I presented an account of phenomenal concepts featuring the 
encapsulation of self-representing experiences, and I argued that this account has strong 
explanatory power.
24
 Next, I will investigate the ontological consequences of the 
encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts. 
 
One may think that the proposed account of phenomenal concepts encapsulating experiences 
is similar to the physicalist constitutional account, which also has it that phenomenal concepts 
are constituted by experiences. It isn’t. There are several differences between these accounts, 
and these differences have important ontological consequences regarding the referents of 
phenomenal concepts. Most importantly, physicalist constitutional accounts aim at a 
physicalist explanation of anti-physicalist puzzles. Hence, they have to explain the conceptual 
isolation and the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts in a way that does not introduce non-
physical entities. 
In section two we noticed that Papineau meets the physicalist requirement in a first step, 
when he introduces neural templates as the vehicles of phenomenal concepts. The second step 
in a successful physicalist account of phenomenal concepts consists in giving a physicalist 
account of how a neural template can be part of a phenomenal concept and how it can yield 
introspectively accessible information about the phenomenal character of experiences. This 
attempt fails because the physicalist move to point at neural templates involved in 
phenomenal concepts does not suffice to explain how the concepts can facilitate the relevant 
information. To facilitate the relevant information, the phenomenal concept has to involve the 
right phenomenal mode of presentation. Thus, the outcome of my analysis was the following: 
accounts of phenomenal concepts that deny a constitutional link between the phenomenal 
mode of presentation involved in the concept and its referent—i.e. pure demonstrative 
accounts as well as Papineau´s account—cannot reach the explanatory target of the PCS. 
 
Contrary to Papineau’s model, there exist physicalist constitutional accounts that 
acknowledge the importance of the phenomenal modes of presentation involved in 
phenomenal concepts. For example, Loar’s (1990/1997) direct recognitional account, Hill and 
McLaughlin’s conceptual role account (1999) as well as Block’s (2007) constitutional account 
all utilize the phenomenal mode of presentation to explain the uniqueness of phenomenal 
concepts. The outcome of my analysis so far is that this is exactly the right path to an account 
of phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power. But, I will argue, the physicalist 
cannot take this path.  
Let me explain. The appeal to the mode of presentation involved in a phenomenal concept 
has to be spelled out in detail to explain the concept´s cognitive role. The self-representing 
character of the experiences provides such an explanation. But granting the self-representing 
character of the encapsulated experience turns out to be problematic for the physicalist. In 
order to see this, we need to notice that defenders of the PCS grant that the experiences 
involved in the concepts do not seem physical.
25
 From this, I will first infer that experiences 
seem non-physical, and then argue that experiences are non-physical.  
                                                 
24
 The following objection might be raised against a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts: if the 
experience is a constitutional part of the phenomenal concept, how can proponents of this thesis account for 
Mary’s true thought involving a phenomenal concept that she is currently not having a red experience? Note that 
my considerations aim at basic applications of phenomenal concepts, viz. applications of phenomenal concepts 
to occurrent experiences. I find it highly plausible to hold that on a basic application of a phenomenal concept, 
Mary cannot truly think she is currently not having a red experience. But I am open to different accounts of what 
sort of concept of red experiences she can employ to truly think this thought. For example, some philosophers 
(Balog 2009; Papineau 2007) answer this question by pointing at derivative applications of phenomenal concepts 
that do not imply an occurring experience and are used in the true thought mentioned before.  
25 Some representationalists (for example, Hill (forthcoming)) react to the fact that experiences seem non-
physical in the following way: they claim that, besides our intuition to the contrary, we need to introduce a 
 I start by considering an objection that targets my claim that experiences that do not seem 
physical, do seem non-physical. One might point out, following Armstrong´s (1968) 
argumentation illustrated by the “headless woman illusion”, that “the experience does not 
seem physical” doesn’t entail that “the experience seems non-physical.” I do not think that 
this objection applies to self-representing experiences. 
Let me start pointing out a disanalogy between Armstrong´s original example and the case 
of experiences. Note how Armstrong states his argument:  
 
“What the example shows is that (…) it is very natural for human beings to pass from 
something that is true: “I do not perceive that X is Y”, to something that may be false 
“I perceive that X is not Y”. (Armstrong 1968: 48)  
 
On the first interpretation, the example is intended to show that there may be Xs that are Y but 
which are not perceived as being Y. In other words: one might falsely pass from a statement 
about how X seems to a statement about the nature of X. Thus, the fact that the example is put 
in terms of “perceiving”—a success word—is crucial. Note that in our case we are concerned 
with how an experience seems. “Seeming” is not a success word, and we do not intend to infer 
something about the ontological nature of experiences; i.e. we do not infer that experiences 
are not physical. Hence, there is no room for a scenario that parallels the headless woman 
illusion.
26
 In contrast to the headless woman illusion, the entailment in the experience-case 
remains at the level of seemings and does not pass to the ontological nature of the thing. So 
the inference from “an experience does not seem physical” to “an experience does seem non-
physical” cannot be in the same sense fallacious as the original Armstrong case.  
Next, one might admit the disanalogy, but object that the Armstrong example is open to a 
second interpretation that does not focus on “perceiving” as a success word. Rather it 
concentrates on the illegitimate shift of the scope of negation. This second interpretation also 
applies at the level of seemings and amounts to the following claim: an experience can fail to 
seem physical, because it seems something else, say Z, and from that one cannot conclude 
that it seems non-physical. I admit that this is a possible scenario for many cases of 
representations. However, I think that experiences are a special case. There are two possible 
ways to argue for the conclusion that the experience seems non-physical.  
First, when we reflect on the ontological status of an occurrent experience by explicitly 
considering two possibilities—physicality or non-physicality—the experience does not seem 
physical. Therefore, from the statement “X does not seem physical” and the additional 
consideration whether X seems physical or non-physical, we can conclude that “X seems non-
physical”.  
Second, even if we do not consider the physicality of the experience explicitly, we can see 
that the experience seems non-physical. The reason is that the experience does not seem 
physical because it seems Z, where seeming Z is such that it entails seeming non-physical. 
                                                                                                                                                        
distinction between the appearance and the reality of experiences. Their main claim is that representations 
explain the appearances of experiences. Hence, the non-physicality is taken to concern only the seeming 
(representation) and not the reality of experiences. It is easy to see why this explanatory move does not succeed 
in the case of the encapsulation account: on the encapsulation account, the representing item represents in terms 
of the represented one. If the non-physicality concerns the representation and the representation is constituted by 
the represented item, the non-physicality also applies to the represented item. 
26 One might try to construe the “seeming” case as structurally analogous to the original Armstrong case. To do 
this, a seeming/reality distinction has to be introduced also on the level of seemings. I think that this is 
problematic, for it does not make sense to say that there are experiences that fail to seem Y, but their real 
seeming-nature is Y. Experiences might have a hidden ontological nature, but it is implausible to hold that they 
have a hidden seeming that goes beyond the way that they seem to us. (Some philosophers doubt this. For 
example, on Lycan’s higher-order theory (1997: 758): “(…) a second-order monitor could break down and make 
a first-order state seem to seem to me in a way that the state does not in fact seem to me”.)  
(Let me emphasize that we are not looking for a seeming that entails that something is non-
physical. The question is rather if there is a seeming that entails that something seems non-
physical) Note that such Z would add also a further explanation as to why experiences do not 
seem physical. 
I think that there is such a decisive seeming that is part of every experience. It is the 
subjective character of an experience (Nagel 1974). Experiences are necessarily experienced 
from the first person perspective. Thus, every experience, regardless if it is a blue experience, 
pain experience, or tasting red wine experience, is constituted by appearing as a subjective 
one. I take the fact that the subjective character of an experience seems inseparable from how 
an experience seems to us, to generate the widely accepted intuition of distinctness.
27
 States 
that are accessed from a first person perspective and hence subjective seem fundamentally 
distinct from those that are accessible from a third person perspective and hence objective. 
Physical states are taken to belong to the latter class, which seems fundamentally distinct from 
the former, subjective class. The upshot is when a state seems subjective, it seems non-
physical.
28
 Hence, the first outcome of my analysis is that the experience which is 
encapsulated in a phenomenal concept and constitutes its mode of presentation seems non-
physical. 
The further conclusion that the experience is not-physical is independently supported, 
namely by the self-representing nature of the experience. Self-representation is a mark of 
entities which do not give rise to a distinction between the representing and the represented 
item. In this case, we do not have to search for the represented item; it is right there, in the 
representation. Note that an X, that represents itself, can do this in various ways. It can do this 
via one of its properties, say Z, and nonetheless fail to display another of its (maybe essential) 
properties, say Y.  
This is the main line that the defenders of the physicalist constitutional account advocate: 
the self-representing experience simply does not represent itself in terms of its fundamental 
nature—it has a hidden physical nature that is not part of the representation.29 I grant that an 
experience can represent itself in different terms than those of its fundamental nature (Y), say 
via Z, and fail to display Y. However, an experience cannot represent itself in terms of a 
property that contradicts its fundamental nature, i.e., the experience cannot represent itself as 
being non-Y, while it’s hidden nature is Y. In the case of self-representation this would 
amount to the claim that an experience is both Y and non-Y. Therefore, a self-representing 
experience that represents itself as being non-physical can have a lot of other properties that 
are not part of the representation, but physicality cannot be among those hidden properties. 
                                                 
27 Papineau (2007: 135) states the intuition of distinctness as follows: “It seems undeniable that most people have 
a strong intuition of mind-brain-distinctness—an intuition that pains are something extra to brain states, say. This 
intuition (…) persists even among those (like me) who are persuaded (…) that dualism must be false.” Note that 
he explicitly holds that “[the intuition of distinctness] is not an intuition of apparently contingent truth (…) but 
simply a direct intuition of falsity.” (2007: 134 [my emphasize]) Papineau thinks that the direct intuition of falsity 
of physicalism can be explained by the joined exercise of a phenomenal and a physical concept. I argued that his 
account fails in its attempt to explain away dualist intuitions. But I think there is another, more natural, 
explanation for the “direct intuition of falsity of physicalism” at hand, namely, that experiences seem subjective 
and, hence, non-physical. 
28 One might object, following Loar (1997: 610), that “there is no incoherence in the thought that the 
"subjectivity" of a phenomenal quality is identical with an objective physical-functional aspect of that property.” 
I want to emphasize again that I am not claiming that the subjective character implies non-physicality. I just hold 
that seeming subjective implies seeming non-physical. 
29 One example of this explanatory move is found in Hill (forthcoming):“It is necessary to explain how it is 
possible to grasp X experientially without appreciating its identity with Y. It is normally possible to provide such 
an explanation by invoking some sort of appearance/reality distinction. Thus, we might distinguish between X 
itself and a property that serves as the mode of presentation for X. Or, if there is no other property that serves as 
the mode of presentation for X, (…) then we might distinguish between X-as-it-is-in-itself and X-as-it-is-
represented by an experiential representation”.  
My conclusion is that a self-representing experience that seems non-physical cannot be 
physical. 
 
This dualist outcome can be put also in another way, by utilizing Block’s (2007) distinction 
between the cognitive mode of presentation and the metaphysical mode of presentation. The 
former is seen as a property of the representation and the latter is seen as a property of the 
referent. Block argues that different cognitive modes of presentation do not require different 
metaphysical modes of presentation and, hence, no property dualism follows from the fact 
that an experience can be cognitively presented in different ways.  
According to my analysis, in the case of phenomenal concepts, an instance of the referent 
is part of the concept and constitutes the concept´s mode of presentation. Therefore, the 
property of the cognitive mode of presentation does not only fix the reference, it also is a 
property of the referent. This property is not represented as a physical one. On the additional 
assumption that we either consider the physicality of the property explicitly or we focus on 
the subjective character of the property, we can conclude that it is represented as a non-
physical one. It might be the case that the referent has further, hidden, properties that are not 
part of the cognitive mode of presentation. But the cognitive mode of presentation cannot 
exhibit a property that contradicts the metaphysical mode of presentation. Therefore, 
physicality cannot be part of the metaphysical mode of presentation of the referent of a 
phenomenal concept. In short: experiences cannot be physical. 
 
The upshot is that the structure of phenomenal concepts is not neutral with respect to the 
ontological nature of their referents. The explanatory feature of the experience involved in the 
concept—its self-representing character—gives the encapsulation account an ontological bite. 
Therefore, the physicalist faces a dilemma: 
If she denies the importance of the mode of presentation involved in the concept, as 
demonstrative accounts as well as Papineau´s (2007) account do, she cannot explain the 
cognitive role of phenomenal concepts satisfactorily.  
But if she explains the cognitive role by defending a constitutional account that involves 
the phenomenal mode of presentation (as e.g. Block (2007) does), then, according to my 
argumentation, she also has to accept that self-representing experiences constitute 
phenomenal concepts. Once granted that there is no separate mode of presentation involved, 
the experience cannot be seen as just a mode of presenting a physical referent. In particular, it 
cannot be seen as a mode of presenting a physical referent in terms other than it really is. 
Thus, the physicalist will end up with non-physical entities being the direct referents of 
phenomenal concepts. Obviously, in the latter case the physicalist target of the PCS can no 
longer be reached.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The physicalist attempt to reduce consciousness is challenged by anti-physicalist arguments 
based on the phenomenal character of mental states. The PCS is often seen as a powerful 
contemporary response to these arguments. My analysis targets new insights on phenomenal 
concepts and their consequences for the problem of consciousness. 
I demonstrated that, in accordance with the PCS, the new concepts involved in the Mary-
scenario differ in several significant respects from any other concept-type. Jackson’s 
knowledge argument teaches us that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated and have 
very special acquisition-conditions. I combined this with another outcome of the Mary-
scenario, namely that phenomenal concepts play the cognitive role of carrying introspectively 
accessible information about the phenomenal character of experiences. These two insights 
from the knowledge argument capture the particularities of phenomenal concepts best, and 
they require an explanation.  
First, I argued that the existing physicalist accounts cannot meet both explanatory 
requirements. Second, I presented an account of phenomenal concepts that can explain both 
particularities of phenomenal concepts in a satisfactory way. To establish this account, I 
argued that phenomenal concepts are structured in a very particular way—they encapsulate 
self-representing experiences. In a third step, I demonstrated that the self-representing 
experiences best explain the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. In a last step, I argued 
that in the case of self-representation, the representation cannot display properties that 
contradict properties of the represented item. Since self-representing experiences seem non-
physical, we can conclude that the referents of phenomenal concepts are non-physical. 
Hence, the encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts not only has strong explanatory 
power. Because the reference of a phenomenal concept is determined by its inner constitution 
involving self-representing experiences, it also implies dualist consequences. To conclude, the 
account of phenomenal concepts that explains their uniqueness satisfactorily cannot be used 
to explain away our dualist intuitions. Rather, it reinforces dualism. 
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